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Abstract 
 
JENNIFER MAREK: Evaluating Determinants of Perceptions of Corruption  
in the European Union 
(Under the direction of Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Holger Moroff) 
 
Corruption is one of the key problems facing the European Union (EU) as it seeks to 
integrate the 27 member states into an even more cohesive economic unit during a period of 
austerity.  A number of studies have documented regional patterns of corruption and 
corruption perception within the EU.  Explanations for other variations in perceptions of 
corruption, however, are left incomplete in the literature.  To explain these variations, this 
author analyzes 2005, 2007, and 2009 Eurobarometer data.  This author finds EU-wide 
increases in the perceived amount of corruption can be linked to the economic 
downturn.  Moreover, exceptional increases can be explained by well-publicized political 
scandals.  In one particularly interesting case, Spain, sizable fluctuations in perceptions of 
corruption in law enforcement can be associated to the perceived effectiveness of anti-
corruption efforts.  EU policymakers, who are in the process of structuring programs to 
reduce corruption, should incorporate these factors into their programs.   
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 I. Introduction 
The 2008 Great Recession sent shockwaves throughout the EU shaking its economic, 
political, and societal foundations.  In the ensuing months, it was not at all clear whether or 
not the EU would remain intact.  However, while global players monitored the possibility of 
the EU’s collapse, the EU and its 27 Member States went to work to reverse the economic 
downturn.  Their efforts focused on all factors that impacted negatively on either the internal 
market or economic stability.  High on that list of barriers was corruption.  A 2011 
Commission Communication placed a price tag of EUR120 billion on losses directly 
attributable to corruption.1  Other sources commented on, but could not quantify, the cost of 
foregone investment opportunities.   
The negative economic effects of real and perceived corruption were not the EU’s 
only concern.  The EU was also well aware that corruption had a deleterious effect on public 
institutions, political participation, and regime stability.2 
From afar, one would not necessarily associate the EU with pervasive 
corruption.  The EU includes some of the oldest, and wealthiest, democracies in the 
world.  In fact, fully one-third of the EU members rank in the top 20 in the world for low 
corruption; and nearly all other member states are ranked in the top 50.3  Despite these 
generally positive rankings, EU progress in this area seems to have stalled.   
                                                 
1 EC 2011: 3. 
 
2 EC 2011: 3. 
 
3 Out of 180 countries worldwide, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. 
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Recent Eurobarometer (EB) surveys disclosed that the percentage of EU citizens who 
believe corruption to be a major problem in their country increased from 72% in 2005 to 75% 
in 2007 and increased once again to 78% in 2009.4  Those same surveys also revealed a 
considerable deterioration in EU citizens’ trust in politicians, national governments, public 
institutions, and government bodies.  This situation begs the question: What factors account 
for varying responses dealing with perceived corruption throughout the EU? 
The purpose of this study is threefold.  First, I analyze the validity of the EB 
explanations for variation in perceptions of corruption using several statistical techniques.  I 
then expand upon the EB arguments by including several other causal variables previously 
advanced in political corruption literature to determine if there is merit in the EB 
explanations.  Specifically, I argue economic conditions influence perceptions of corruption, 
to varying degrees, based upon overall economic strength in the member state.  Poor macro-
economic performance can engender negative evaluations of government, detailed in 
previous scholarly work (Mauro 1995; Treisman 2000).  Secondly, I argue that large changes 
in perceived corruption levels, evident in the 2009 EB survey, can be attributed to well-
publicized corruption scandals.  Corruption scandals erode public trust in politicians and 
institutions, intensifying negative perceptions of corruption.   
Lastly, I perform a detailed analysis of the peculiar case of Spain, a member state 
with one of the most dramatic shifts in perceptions of corruption in law enforcement 
institutions in both the 2007 and 2009 surveys.  Although noticeable changes occurred in 
several member states during this time, Spain is the only case that is left unexplained by the 
EB arguments.  For this case I argue the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts—as 
                                                 
4 EB surveys 2005-2009.  
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perceived by the public via news media coverage—provides the best explanation for changes 
in perceived corruption levels in law enforcement institutions.   
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a review of literature 
highlighting the relationships between national-level economic and political factors and 
individual-level perceptions of corruption.  In the next section, a detailed analysis of Spain is 
presented, with a particular emphasis on corruption scandals, anti-corruption measures, and 
the intermediary role of the news media.  Data collection methodology is presented in 
Section 4, followed by an explanation of statistical techniques in Section 5.  The penultimate 
portion of this study discusses the empirical results. The seventh and final section concludes 
with this study’s policy implications and suggestions for further research.
 II. Review of Literature 
Corruption literature advances numerous economic, political, and social theories for 
the analysis of perceptions of corruption.  High perceptions of corruption, if ignored, can 
reduce political participation, erode trust in public officials, and essentially undermine the 
very basis of government (Olken 2005; Morris and Klesner 2010; Rose and Mishler 2010).  
Awareness of public attitudes on corruption is also important for the development of 
effective anti-corruption policies.5  Included in the following section is a summary of the 
current literature on perceptions of corruption.  Here I show the strength of economic and 
political theories for explaining determinants of, and variance in, perceptions of corruption in 
the EU.  

Scholarly literature has consistently found a critical link between corruption and 
economic development (Mauro 1995; Lambsdorff 2005; Rose-Ackermann 1999).  These 
studies detail the significant effects that both the experience and perception of corruption can 
have on the economic conditions of the Member States.   
Empirical evidence in Paulo Mauro’s 1995 study confirms the association between 
corruption and reduced foreign direct investment and private sector business (Tanzi 1998; 
Budak 2006).  Rose-Ackermann (1999) and Lambsdorff (2005) also validate these adverse 
macro-economic effects.6  In other words, even though there is no legal restriction on an 
                                                 
5 Olken 2005: 3. 
6 Cited in Pázmándy 2010: 54.  
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American company investing its capital in a new facility in Romania, the American company 
will not take that action if it believes Romania has a poor business climate.  Corruption, and 
particularly the perception of corruption, is a critical element in that equation.   
Other economic factors—such as macro-economic performance, unemployment 
levels, and GDP growth—can also affect an individual’s perception of government 
institutions and political leaders (Schliefer and Vishny 1993; Seligson 2002; Rose-
Ackermann 1999).  If a country’s economy is declining, the public will have a more 
pessimistic view of the country’s political institutions.  Conversely, if a country’s economy is 
thriving, the public will be more tolerant of the country’s public officials and institutions 
(Mauro 1995; Knack and Keefer 1995; Treisman 2000).  Melgar et al (2010) investigated the 
relationship between macro-economic performance and perceptions of corruption Europe, 
North America, Asia, and Latin America. They found an inverse association between GDP 
per capita and perceptions of corruption—as GDP per capita increased, the perception of 
corruption declined.7  Furthermore, Melgar et al found the inflation rate and general 
economic stability augmented corruption perceptions (2010).  According to these existing 
studies, in general, national economic circumstances are significant causal factors in the 
determination of perceptions of corruption.  
In a similar vein, Rose and Mishler (2010) found national economic growth and the 
privatization of public goods impact perceptions of corruption.  Abramo (2007) analyzed 
perceptions of corruption among 44 countries and found many lower income countries to 
have higher perceptions of corruption overall.  Wealthier countries, in contrast, tended to 
have lower perceptions of corruption. 
                                                 
7 Melgar et al 2010: 129. 
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In addition to the potential economic consequences of high perceptions of corruption, 
a number of adverse political and social consequences can also occur.  High levels of 
perceptions of corruption can reinforce corrupt behaviors, damage anti-corruption efforts by 
inducing actual corruption, and undermine the legitimacy of government institutions.8 

Political theories generally focus on how institutional and structural factors affect real 
and perceived corruption levels.  Two relevant arguments advanced from this perspective are 
institutional trust and the structure of state-society relations.   
Theories on both political and interpersonal trust have emerged at the forefront of 
corruption literature in recent years (Morris and Klesner 2010; Van de Walle 2008; Rothstein 
and Uslaner 2005; Chanley et al 2000).  Rothstein and Uslaner suggest, “At the individual 
level, people who believe that in general most other people in their society [including public 
officials] can be trusted are also more inclined to have a positive view of their democratic 
institutions (2005: 41).”  Wallace and Latcheva (2006) provide empirical support for this 
argument in their 2006 study of Central and Eastern European countries.  They find a 
negative, significant relationship between trust in public institutions and perceptions of 
corruption; as trust decreases, perceptions of corruption increase.9  Evidence from Spain also 
indicates a statistically significant relationship between trust and perceptions.10 
Other political theories argue the quality of institutions and legal culture affect 
perceptions of corruption (Tanzi 1995; Weighart 1995; Heywood 1997).  In his extensive, 
cross-national study on causes of corruption, Daniel Treisman finds citizens living in a 
                                                 
8 Cabelkova 2006: 1.   
 
9 Wallace and Latcheva 2006: 82. 
 
10 Villoria et al 2011. 
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‘stable democracy’ (one with uninterrupted democratic rule since 1950) have lower 
perceptions of corruption (2000).  He also finds a British legal tradition and federally 
structured government are correlated with lower levels of perceived corruption (Treisman 
2000 and La Porta et al 1998).  Arnold J. Heidenheimer’s also embraces historically 
conditioned relationships and also broadens this notion to include crucial cultural factors 
such as norms and community values (1970).  One of Heidenheimer’s primary arguments 
suggests the structure of state-society relations is essential for understanding how (and what) 
people classify ‘corrupt’ behavior (2000: 399-401; also Rosensen 2009; Heidenheimer 1970).  
For the EU, historical factors can help explain some of the variation in perceptions of 
corruption among member states (i.e. Western vs. Eastern Europe, North vs. South). 
Another aspect of the trust-perception of corruption nexus involves the effect of 
political corruption scandals.  Scandals involving public officials weaken citizens’ trust in 
other government officials and consequently erode public trust in the institutions for which 
they work.11  Bowler and Karp’s 2004 analysis examined two specific cases, the United 
States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK).  Results revealed political scandals involving 
members of Congress and Parliament weakened public regard for those officials and also 
legislative institutions in general.  When applied to the EU, the trust-perception theory can 
help explain how the incidence of a major scandal augmented perceived corruption levels in 
several institutions to such a great extent in 2009. 
A key factor in the effect of scandals on both trust in institutions and perceptions of 
corruption is the role of the media, or what Villoria et al contend is the “mediatization of 
politics (2011:7).”  The mediatization of politics can generate “increased feelings of distrust 
                                                 
11 Bowler and Karp 2004. 
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in power, which has emerged among citizens in the wake of the increased visibility of 
political scandals (Villoria et al 2011:7).”  Rose and Mishler uncover additional statistical 
evidence in support of this argument, “multilevel analyses show that corruption perceptions 
are heavily influenced by media reports (2008: 3).”  Furthermore, they find “86 percent [of 
Russian respondents] say they learn a lot or something about corruption from national 
televisions and newspapers” (2010: 16).”12  Throughout 2007-2009, major corruption 
scandals occurred in Austria, the UK, Finland, Malta, and Spain; all were heavily publicized 
in national media outlets.   A constant barrage of negative information on government and 
public officials virtually ensures reduced levels of trust and higher perceptions of corruption.  

The social environment can be particularly influential on individual attitudes towards 
corruption.  In corruption literature, levels of education, gender, and age have been widely 
cited as some of the main determinants of perceptions of corruption (Melgar et al 2010; Rose 
and Mishler 2010; Swamy et al 2001; Gatti et al 2003).  However, empirical support for the 
latter two is mixed.  Individuals with more education tend to be more involved with politics, 
have higher levels of political efficacy, and perceive lower levels of corruption.  Gatti et al 
(2003) find evidence that women are more likely to be less tolerant (perceive higher levels of 
corruption) than men.  Conversely, Cabelkova (2001) finds socioeconomic variables—
occupation, employment status, age, and gender—to have only a minimal influence on 
perceptions of corruption (in her case study of Ukraine).13 
                                                 
12 Cited in Uhl 2011: 11.  
 
13 Cabelkova: 23.  
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The effects of social factors are apparent to a certain extent in the EB data.  At the 
individual-level, the effect of socioeconomic factors is weak.  In the 2009 EB, survey data 
indicates the education level, and to a lesser extent age, of a respondent influences 
perceptions the most.  The greatest variation among responses is apparent in these categories.   
Lastly, there is the somewhat obvious causal relationship between corruption 
experience and corruption perception.  However, copious studies consistently provide 
empirical evidence of weak, statistically insignificant relationships between experience and 
perception (Pázmándy2011; Donchev and Ujhelyi 2006).  Rose and Mishler (2008, 2010) 
confirm in multiple studies, “that there are large discrepancies in the number of individuals 
who perceive that corruption in their country and those who report having experienced 
corruption personally (2008: 3).”  Instead, scholars posit economic and political factors bear 
the most influence on perceived corruption levels.   
Another perspective on the determinants of corruption perception is presented in Rose 
and Mishler’s 2008 work.  They suggest perceptions of corruption in one institution will have 
an “echo chamber” effect on other institutions; “most individuals tend to perceive the relative 
corruption of [institutions] similarly (2008: 14).”  Thus, perceptions of corruption in one 
institution—for example, the national government—can greatly influence an individual’s 
evaluation of other government bodies or public officials.   

The preceding three perspectives provide the theoretical foundation for the following 
hypotheses:   
H1: Weaker economic performance will lead to more negative perceptions of 
corruption.  
H2: Major corruption scandals during 2007-2009 augmented perceptions of 
corruption in the five ‘scandal’ member states. 
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The social and political perspectives advanced in this section are also applicable to 
the case of Spain.  Specifically, the “mediatization” of politics and the effect of corruption 
scandals are of particular importance in the time-series analysis of perceptions of corruption 
in Spanish law enforcement institutions.  
 III. Case Study: Spain 
Political corruption has been a permanent feature of Spain's landscape since its 1978 
transition from dictatorship to democracy.14  To their credit, the Spanish people recognize 
that not all politicians, public officials, and government employees are equally culpable.  In 
fact, Latinobarómetro survey data show distinct layers of perceptions of corruption.  
Politicians and political parties fare the worst (see Table 1, p. 12).15  That outcome is not 
surprising since most scandals have involved politicians involved in improper fund-raising 
for their parties or politicians receiving kickbacks on public contracts (IDE 2007; IDE 2008; 
Villoria et al 2011).  There is greater support for the judiciary; and there is even greater 
support for the police (see Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Villoria et al 2011.  
 
15 Latinobarómetro data is used to here to show long-term patterns in corruption perceptions.  Data in this 
database dates back to 1996, as opposed to the EB surveys that only have data from 2005 onward. 
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Table 1. Confidence in the Police, Judiciary, and Political Parties16 
Year  Confidence in Police  Confidence in 
Judiciary 
Confidence in 
Parties 
1996 68.7 47.7 34.8 
1997 73.3 48.3 43.4 
1998 70.6 46.5 37.5 
2001 71.1 45.7 48.4 
2002 71.9 42.3 29.1 
2003 68.9 48.8 29.8 
2004 66.2 -  - 
2006 72.6 50.2 28.4 
2007 76.4 44.9 28.0 
2008 73.4 39.6 24.8 
2009 70.6 42.4 20.6 
2010 72.6 39.7 16.0 
Source: Latinobarómetro (Percentage of respondents with some to a lot of confidence) 
 
Whereas the Latinobarómetro surveys show the public's confidence in law 
enforcement agencies to be relatively constant over time, the EB surveys report dramatic 
swings in recent years.  The percentage of EB respondents stating that corruption was 
widespread in law enforcement agencies dropped by more than 50% in the 2005-2007 time 
period.  The scores for the police fell from 39% to 19%; the scores for the judiciary fell from 
41% to 17%; and the scores for customs officials fell from 41% to 20%.  Just as 
striking, those percentages jumped by more than 100% in the 2007-2009 time period—
thereby wiping out the previous gains. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Information and survey data on perceived corruption is difficult to find.  Only recently have scholars started 
to inquire about Spanish citizens´ attitudes towards corruption in greater detail (CIS barometer, Eurobarometer, 
IDE-Fundación Alternativas).  Specific survey data/information on perceptions of corruption among law 
enforcement officials is even more rare.   
 13
Table 2. Perceptions of Corruption, Spain 2005-2009 
 2005 2007 2009 
Yes, Major Problem 73 83 88 
Ntnl Institutions 74 78 91 
Reg Institutions 73 79 89 
Local Institutions 74 83 89 
Police 39 19 46 
Judicial 41 17 47 
Customs 41 20 42 
Source: EB survey data 2005-2009 (Percentage of respondents that agree there is corruption) 
 
This V-shaped pattern is probably best understood in the specific context of Spanish 
political developments during the period in question.  I argue that the media initially 
highlighted the government's successes in detaining corrupt officials.  The public, in turn, 
formed more favorable opinions of law enforcement agencies.  As time went on, however, 
the media tended to report stories dealing with the ineffectiveness of the anti-corruption laws 
and the court system.  Here, I argue that the media's actions caused public opinion to abruptly 
shift in a negative direction. 

This case study examines substantive evidence for the following hypotheses:   
H3: Extensive media coverage of successful anti-corruption efforts and corruption 
scandals from 2005-2007, led to lower levels of perceived corruption in Spanish law 
enforcement institutions. 
H3a: Extensive media coverage on the failure of anti-corruption efforts during 2007-
2009, coupled with new corruption scandals, led to higher perceptions of corruption 
in Spanish law enforcement institutions. 
 
The remainder of the case study provides an overview of some of the major—and 
most publicized—corruption scandals and anti-corruption efforts in recent Spanish history.  
This is followed by a more thorough analysis of media coverage of anti-corruption efforts 
and its effect on perceptions of corruption in law enforcement institutions. 
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
Recent economic and political history has influenced both real and perceived 
corruption to a significant degree.  The first decade and a half of democracy in Spain was 
rather eventful—devolution of power to local and regional politicians in the newly formed 16 
Autonomous Communities; a failed military coup attempt in 1981; and admission in the EU 
in 1986.17  In addition to the transformation of the political system, Spain also experienced 
rapid economic growth in the 1980s—especially in the construction and real estate sectors 
(Villoria et al 2011; Heywood 1997, 2007; IDE 2007).  Combined with underdeveloped legal 
codes, these factors provided an ideal environment for corruption.18  As a result, a wave of 
scandals erupted in Spain in the early 1990s.19 
The frequency of corruption in the 1990s escalated political distrust (and perceptions 
of corruption) to all-time highs.  In 1993, 88% of respondents thought there was “quite a lot 
or a lot” of corruption in their country.  In 1997, 92% of respondents believed corruption was 
“quite to a very serious problem.”20 
To remedy the situation, the national government devoted more resources to 
combating corruption in the mid-1990s.  One of the key elements in the early fight against 
corruption was the creation of a specialized anti-corruption body, the Special Prosecutors 
Office for the Repression of Economic Offences Related to Corruption (Fiscalía 
Anticorrupción or ACPO) in 1995.21  Operating under the supervision of the Ministry of the 
                                                 
17 Villoria et al 2011: 5 
 
18 IDE 2007. 
 
19 Villoria et al 2011: 5; IDE 2007-2008. 
 
20 IDE 2007: 203. Data sources include CIRES estudio 21, CIS and CNEP data.  
 
21 OECD 2007: 65. 
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Interior, ACPO is responsible for the investigation and initiation of criminal proceedings for 
any public official or private individuals involved in corrupt offenses.22  Several sub-units 
support the head prosecutors including the Policía Judicial de España (Judicial Police Unit), 
comprised of 25 members from both the Policía Nacional (National Police) and Guardia 
Civil (Civil Guard).23  Along with the Judicial Police Unit, there is a much larger contingent 
within the Policía Nacional, the Unidad contra la Delincuencia Económica y Fiscal (Fiscal 
and Economic Crimes Unit, UDEF), responsible for investigating crimes committed by 
public officials related to economic or fiscal corruption.24 

Instrumental to the effect of anti-corruption on perceptions of corruption in law 
enforcement is the role of the media in disseminating information on corruption scandals and 
anti-corruption efforts to the public.  Media outlets tend to use two techniques—agenda-
setting and framing—to portray news stories in a particular manner (de Vreese 2002, 2004, 
2007; de Vreese et al 2001; and Iyengar and Kinder 1987).  “Agenda-setting refers to the 
idea that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on certain 
issues and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences.”25  Framing differs 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
22 Some of the crimes that can be prosecuted by ACPO include: Offence of abuse or illicit use of privileged 
information, misappropriation of public funds, offences of exercise of undue influence, fraud, extortion, and 
bribery (UNODC). Also GRECO 2001 Evaluation of Spain: 65-66. 
 
23 OECD 2007: 65. 
 
24 El Real Decreto núm. 769/1987.  http://www.policia.es/org_central/judicial/udyco/udyco.html 
 
25Scheufele & D. Tewksbury 2007: 11. 
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from agenda-setting by emphasizing the importance of how a news story is depicted and 
subsequently understood by the public.26 
The media’s agenda-setting abilities are evident in Spain during the two-year gap 
between EB surveys.  Trust in the press consistently exceeds trust in political parties and the 
national government.  According to 2007 Standard EB data, 55% of Spanish citizens 
expressed trust in the press, compared to the 32% who trusted political parties.27  Trust in the 
press increased in 2008 to 60%.28  This support provides the media with a distinct advantage 
in shaping public perceptions of corruption.29 
Previous scholarly work also highlights the powerful role of the news media in the 
formation and alteration of citizens’ perceptions of corruption in government and public 
institutions.  Rose and Mishler found substantial support for the effect of newspaper 
circulation on perceived corruption.  Specifically, their analysis indicates, “what people read 
about corruption has a greater impact on their perceptions than anything they witness first-
hand.  This is the case, moreover, regardless of a country’s level of economic development or 
democracy, although it varies a bit by geographic region (2008: 27).” 
Spain's top-3 newspapers published more than 1,000 stories reported dealing with 
corruption and/or influence-peddling in 2006 and again in 2007. 30  See Table 3 on page 17. 31  
                                                 
26 Ibid 2007: 11. 
 
27 Standard Eurobarometer 68. 
 
28 EB 68 was the last survey to ask about trust in the media during the time series analyzed in this study. 
  
29 Uhl 2011: 15.  
 
30 Search conducted in El País, El Mundo, and ABC from January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2009.  
   
31 A comprehensive content analysis was outside the scope of this study; therefore the distinction between 
domestic and international corruption stories was not made in the search.  However, I did analyze the results of 
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The majority of those stories followed the developments of a scandal in the southern resort 
city of Marbella in the province of Malaga.  The close ties between public officials and 
businessmen resulted in multiple incidents of price fixing, manipulation of public 
tenders, and bribery.   
Judge Miguel Angel Torres and members of ACPO led the government’s anti-
corruption initiative in Marbella.32  Police officials provided investigative support, 
conducting searches of government offices during November 2005.33  In the first stage 
of Operation Malaya, nearly three-dozen prominent local and regional politicians were 
charged with abuse of public office on March 29, 2006.  The investigation continued into the 
summer; another 70 people were charged at that time.  The second and third stages of 
Operation Malaya unfolded during the remainder of 2006. Table 4 (p. 18) documents the 
number of new reports dealing primarily with Operation Malaya. 
Table 3. News Articles on Corruption (2006-2009) 
Year El Pais El Mundo ABC 
2006 825 301 348 
2007 658 167 304 
2008 376 229 214 
2009 804 381 521 
Search terms: Corrupción, tráfico de influencias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
each search to ensure that the vast majority of stories discussed corruption cases in Spain.  A small percentage 
of the stories focus on international corruption issues or scandals.  
 
32 El Mundo, 01/04/2006.  
 
33 Herrera 2006. 
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Table 4. News Reports on Anti-Corruption Efforts (2006-2009) 
Year El Pais El Mundo ABC 
2006 594 163 332 
2007 254 89 199 
2008 98 39 68 
2009 30 60 54 
Search Term: Operación Malaya  
Table 4a. News Reports on Anti-Corruption Efforts (2006-2009) 
Year El Pais El Mundo ABC 
2006 892 193 200 
2007 545 168 326 
2008 433 355 264 
2009 731 201 509 
Search Term: Anticorrupcíon 
In addition to the onslaught of media coverage, the national government also initiated 
several new pieces of anti-corruption legislation.  Most of the legislation revised urban 
planning and party financing regulations, while other legislation reorganized ACPO.  In 
addition to Operation Malaya, anti-corruption legislation was passed as well:  Instrucción 
4/06, which created specialized judges selected from the high Courts of justice and the 
creation of a special unit of the Guardia Civil responsible for investigating urban planning 
crimes.”34  Lastly, significantly more resources were allocated to the anti-corruption 
subdivisions within the Policía Nacional and the Guardia Civil.35  While formal anti-
corruption legislation is important in enhancing the legitimacy of law enforcement sectors, 
there was minimal press coverage of these legal developments. 
The positive influence of earlier anti-corruption efforts in 2006-2007 was severely 
diminished when inefficiencies became exposed two years later.  Several studies draw 
                                                 
34 IDE 2008: 241. Other important regulations include: Some of the most important anti-corruption regulations 
to be enacted in 2006-2007 include “el Código del Buen Gobierno, a law regulating conflict-of-interest cases 
for high officials; the modification of some aspects of the basic charter of public employment. In 2007, Spain 
enacted a new law regulating the funding of political parties, (Organic Law 8/2007).  This law allows for greater 
transparency in party financing and more accountability on the part of public officials. 
 
35 IDE 2007-2010. 
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attention to the pitfalls of existing Spanish anti-corruption policy and judicial processes.36  A 
common theme in these studies argues jurisdictional contestation poses a major impediment 
to criminal proceedings.  As a result, there are still 800 pending cases and many cases have 
lasted up until eight years.37  Examples of such sentences are evident in the acquittal of 14 
politicians accused in the Balearic Islands scandal (2008) and Juan Antonio Roca’s—
“mastermind” of the Marbella scandal—early release from prison (2008).38 
Trial verdicts and new developments in corruption cases continued to be covered in 
the media.  From September 2008 - June 2010 nearly 900 stories on political corruption and 
corruption-related issues were published (CIS media analysis 2011, see Figure 1, p. 20).39  
Evidence of public awareness of anti-corruption efficiency is apparent in the 2009 EB 
survey, which indicates 82% of Spanish respondents believe that court sentences are too 
light.40  There were also several public demonstrations over the lack of action by ACPO.41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 IDE 2007; 2008; 2010.  
 
37 IDE 2007: 223.  
 
38 ABC 6/12/2008.  
 
39 Villoria et al 2011: 6. 
 
40 EB325 2009: 78.  This question was not asked in either of the prior surveys, so unfortunately an exact 
comparison is not possible. 
    
41 Villoria et al 2011. 
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Figure 1. Impact of Corruption on the Media (September 2008 - June 2010) 
 
Source: Villoria et al 2011: 17. 
 
The highly noticeable changes reported for perceptions of corruption in law 
enforcement institutions were left unexplained in the 2007 and 2009 EB surveys, warranting 
a thorough examination of potential causal factors.  Negative perceptions of law enforcement 
corruption can reflect poorly on national politicians and institutions, jeopardizing the stability 
of government.  Law enforcement officials are responsible for maintaining the order and 
safety of a society; therefore it is important that citizens regard these institutions as 
legitimate, trustworthy, and free of corruption.  This case study demonstrated the power of 
anti-corruption efforts on public opinion.  Specifically, the perceived effectiveness of those 
efforts, as relayed through the media, can profoundly impact citizens’ perceptions of 
corruption.  
 IV. Data Collection and Methodology  
 Corruption is difficult to measure for a variety of reasons.  It is an elusive act that 
rarely leaves a paper trail.  Definitions of corruption also impede proper measurement.  Its 
meaning varies through time and space, thus a corrupt act in France may be viewed as a 
legitimate method in Romania.  Given the various issues with quantifying corruption, 
researchers have relied upon public opinion surveys, measuring perceptions of corruption, to 
ascertain a country’s level of corruption.   
As indicated in the literature review, opinions are subjective and can be influenced by 
any number of economic, political, or social factors.  Despite these difficulties, corruption 
perception indices have become a standard measurement technique in corruption research.  
The foundation of my analysis rests upon EB data; therefore, a thorough account of its 
methodology is necessary.  The following section describes the methodological process used 
for Special EB corruption surveys and also a brief description of Transparency 
International’s CPI methodology.   

In 2005, the Directorate-General (DG) of Justice, Security, and Freedom requested 
the first Special EB on citizens’ attitudes towards corruption (and organized crime, EB 245).  
Three additional surveys were commissioned in 2007 (EB 291), 2009 (EB 325), and 2011 
(EB 374).42 
                                                 
42 EBs 245, 291, 325, 374 Technical Specifications.  
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National branches of TNS Opinion & Social, a prominent international research 
center, completed most of the research.43  To obtain reliable results, the sample population 
must be selected at random—to decrease the chance of sampling bias.  The EB staff ensures 
this by selecting respondents using a “multi-stage, random (probability) sampling method.”44  
Once the random sample was obtained, approximately 1,000 face-to-face interviews were 
performed in each Member State.45  Face-to-face interviews were completed in the national 
language to ensure comprehension of the subject matter.46  To prevent distortions in the 
distributions (and therefore the results), EB analysts applied marginal (and intercellular) 
weighting procedures to the sample population data.47 
In addition to sampling techniques, the actual design of the questionnaire used in 
public opinion surveys can have substantial effects of the quality of results (Krosnick 1991; 
Saris and Galhofer 2007; Sanchez 1992).  The questionnaire design is consistent for the 
majority of EB surveys (Qualitative EBs are the exception).  In the Special EBs on 
corruption, questions are asked by using batteries of requests or statements, with slight 
variations in the available answers.  Batteries of statements are one of the most popular 
                                                 
43 Tns-opinion.com and ec.europa.eu. A complete list of national polling organizations can be found in the 
Technical Specifications section of Special EB 245, 291, 325, 374 (available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm). 
 
44 Technical Specifications, EB 245, 291, 325, 374.  
 
45 EB website, “Methodology”. Although the total populations for member states are highly divergent, a sample 
size of 1,000 is sufficient for statistical analyses.  Statistical theory argues that once a certain number of units 
have been included in a sample (800-1,000), the improvement in the margin of error is very small.   
 
46 “CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interview) was used in those countries where this technique was 
available.”  Technical Specifications, EB 245, 291, 325, 374.  
 
47 Marginal weights assign groups with a larger portion of the sample distribution higher weights; respondents 
in the lesser portion are assigned lower weights.47 
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question formats in public opinion research.48  In batteries, the request (question), answer 
choices, and any introductory information are presented to the respondent in the first 
statement.  All additional categories or statements (national politicians, local institutions) 
follow without repeating the initial request and answer choices.49 
Despite the popularity of this approach, several potential complications may arise 
from its use.50  One criticism argues respondents may be inclined, “to simplify their task and 
answer all of the requests in a battery the same way.”51  Others contend the agree/disagree 
request measures the strength of agreement with a given statement, not the degree or 
extremity of agreement.52  These complications may lead to measurement error—perceptions 
of corruption that are either more/less than reported in the EB—distorting the results.   
The Special corruption survey questionnaires begin by using the battery approach to 
measure perceptions of corruption in government institutions (local, regional, and national 
levels) and corruption as a major problem: “For each of the following statements, could you 
please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree 
with it.”  A clear, ordinal response scale is given, allowing respondents to express their 
perceptions of corruption to varying degrees.   
The battery format is maintained when the questions become slightly more specific, 
asking respondents about their perceptions of corruption among various public officials.  
However, instead of measuring perceptions of corruption using the Likert scale, the available 
                                                 
48 Saris and Gallhofer 2007: 93. 
 
49 Ibid 2007: 90. 
 
50 Ibid 2007. 
 
51 Ibid 2007: 94. 
 
52 Ibid: 94. 
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answers are either yes or no.  Since there are only two available responses, people who 
perceive corruption to be minimal or moderate, may still respond ‘yes’, possibly affecting the 
reliability of results.53  

The CPI is one of the most used, and most criticized, measures of corruption.  It is an 
annual indicator created by Transparency International (TI) that aggregates data from (up to) 
13 sources by 10 independent institutions.54  An assessment of multiple countries in all 
regions of the world is included in the CPI.55  All sources measure the overall extent of 
corruption (frequency and/or size of corrupt transactions) in the public and political sectors.   
One critique relates to determining the ‘extent of corruption’ in a country.  This is a 
subjective evaluation that is likely influenced by the personal views of individual analysts.  
Additionally, the definition of corruption used by TI focuses solely on quid pro quo 
transactions—bribery, embezzlement, misuse of public funds—thus, other forms of 
corruption such as nepotism or clientelism, is not explicitly evaluated.  Cross-national and 
time series comparisons of CPI data are also problematic.  Michael Johnston addresses this 
methodological concern stating, “Comparability is an issue too: scores for countries with 
thirteen or fourteen surveys must include most or all of the repeated measures—meaning that 
their scores reflect perceptions over several years—while those based on just a handful of 
surveys will not (2000: 15).” 
                                                 
53 Fallowfield 1995: 77.   
 
54 CPI Methodology 2010: 1. For a complete list of sources and institutions used, please visit 
www.transparency.org. 
 
55 Each source organization uses a predetermined definition of corruption to evaluate and assess countries 
included in the survey. 
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Despite the methodological shortcomings of these highly-regarded perception 
surveys, data obtained from both the CPI and EB surveys provide valuable insight into the 
elusive realm of corruption.  Researchers put forth considerable effort to make certain all 
member states, regions, and demographic groups are represented in a uniform manner. 
 V. Statistical Analyses 
Demographic and corruption perception data from the four EB surveys—EB245, 291, 
325, 374—is used to evaluate the hypotheses, though the focus of this study is primarily on 
the 2005-2009 survey data.56  Additional economic variables are created using data from 
Eurostat, the EU’s primary statistical database.57  Two datasets are assembled to test the 
hypotheses.  The first dataset (Data-1) includes economic variables—Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc), unemployment rate, two 
economic sentiment indicators (Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI), Retail Trade 
Confidence Indicator (RCI)), and GDP growth rate—and 10 corruption perception variables, 
all obtained from the EB surveys.58 
A second dataset is constructed using micro-level data from GESIS Zacat.59  GESIS 
data includes individual survey responses from each of the EB surveys, providing 
approximately 26,000 cases for each year of analysis.  This second dataset is primarily 
created because the quantity of case allows me to disaggregate Spanish responses from the 
rest of the EU member states.  Thus, I am able to test H3 and H3a.   


                                                 
56 The 2011 survey was published in February 2012, during the time of writing.  Perceptions of corruption 
remained fairly steady for all EU member states.  Given length and time constraints, this study primarily 
analyzes 2005-2009 data.  2011 data is assessed to provide additional support for H1. 
 
57 Available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ 
 
58 Data-1 is used to statistically analyze perceptions of corruption based on 2011 data since micro-level data has 
not yet been made public. 
 
59 http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/ 
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
There are 10 dependent variables used in this study—perception of corruption as a 
major problem, national, regional, and local institutions and politicians, police, judicial, and 
customs services.60  The primary dependent variables are the perception of corruption as a 
major problem, national institutions and national politicians.  Additional dependent variables 
are included to test the effect of scandals on corruption perceptions (H2) and to assess the 
changes in perceived corruption levels in law enforcement services for the Spanish case 
study (H3).  Variables measuring trust in government institutions are also included in the 
analysis.  Trust in national government, political parties, the justice system, the police, and 
parliament, are obtained from standard EB surveys conducted in the same year as the special 
corruption surveys.61  The trust variables are included in some of the statistical models as 
proxies for the effect of political corruption scandals.   

Gender, education, age and occupation are four individual-level variables typically 
included in social science research, as they have some of the most significant effects 
individual perceptions (Mocan 2004; Rose and Mishler 2010; Cabelkova 2007).  These four 
variables are included in Data-2.62  Several economic variables are also included in the 
analysis to measure the effect of national economic performance on individual perceptions of 
corruption.  GDP and GDPpc are measured in Euros.  GDP growth rate is computed as the 
                                                 
60 Specific questions are available in the EB reports at: http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/ or 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_en.htm 
 
61 Trust in police is used in 2005 and 2007; this was not asked in either 2009 standard EB, so trust in the justice 
system is a proxy for all law enforcement institutions.  Trust in parliament is included for the 2009 analysis as 
another measure of trust in politicians.  A complete description of trust questions asked in the EB surveys are 
available on the Eurobarometer website: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm 
 
62 A complete description of is available at http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/ and in the Appendix. 
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change in the GDP from the previous to current year using a “chain-linked series”.63  
Unemployment rate “represents unemployed persons as a percentage of the economically 
active population” and is based on the EU Labor Force Survey.64  The CCI and RCI are two 
of the Economic Sentiment Indicators.  Answers from the Joint Harmonised EU Programme 
of Business and Consumer Surveys are aggregated and weighted.65 
There are three dependent variables—perceptions of corruption in police, judicial, 
and customs services—and several independent variables—the four demographic variables 
and indicators for trust in institutions—are used in the analysis of the final set of hypotheses 
for the Spanish case study.  Four demographic variables are included as well as indicators for 
trust in institutions.  Lastly, to measure citizens’ evaluations of anti-corruption efforts in 
Spain, I use the question, “are there enough successful prosecutions (country) to deter public 
officials from the giving and taking of bribes?” Additional anti-corruption questions were 
added to the 2009 EB survey and are included in the final model.66 

A series of statistical tests are performed including Spearman’s Rho and Pearson’s R 
(bivariate) correlations and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression.  Bivariate correlation 
and linear regression are performed with the EU-27 data.  Spearman’s Rho, “an index of the 
strength of association between the variables; it ranges from 0 (no association) to +/- 1.00 
(perfect association),” is also used.67  This test assesses the relationship between ordinal 
                                                 
63 A complete description of is available at; http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
64 Eurostat. 
 
65 Eurostat. 
 
66 See Appendix for variable description.  
67 Healy 2007: 347. 
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variables such as GDPpc and CPI score, when rank and order are important for the 
interpretation of results.  Spearman’s Rho is a preliminary statistical analysis used to test H1 
and H1a.  GDPpc and GDP are ranked (highest to lowest) and tested with both the CPI score 
and results from corruption as a major problem (EBQ1) question.   
OLS regression is the key statistical test used to evaluate the remaining hypotheses.  
This method enables researchers to determine a dependence relationship between two (or 
more) variables.  Regressions are performed using both datasets; the first to determine 
dependence relationships between economic variables and perceptions of corruption for the 
EU-27 and again for Spain.   
To test H2, prediction equations are created from linear regression results using 2007 
data.  For the five member states with above average perceptions of corruption in 2009, the 
EB argued corruption scandals augmented these scores.  To evaluate the validity of this 
argument and H2, I obtain prediction equations using 2007 EB data (from Data-1).  2009 
scores are computed using the 2008-2009 average of the economic indicators for the five 
“scandal” member states.68  If the computed score does not match the reported EB score, then 
economic factors do not fully explain changes in perceptions of corruption; corruption 
scandals can account for the additional increases in perceived corruption levels.  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
68 For certain government institutions, other variables provided a better explanation of perceptions of 
corruption.  Average scores from 2008-2009 for all variables are used in the prediction equations.  
 VI. Results and Discussion 
 Three statistical models are constructed to determine the strength of national 
economic conditions on perceptions of corruption (H1).  The first model includes CPI scores, 
EBQ1, GDP, and GDPpc.   

To provide a more accurate account of the effect of economic variables on 
perceptions of corruption, CPI scores are used as the dependent variable in the first model—
which contains corruption scores for the 27 member states dating back to 1998.69  
Spearman’s Rho was initially applied to this data, due to the ordinal nature of the variables.  
Results indicate a strong, positive, and statistically significant correlation between GDPpc 
and CPI score (Table 3 below)—there is a direct, positive relationship between perceived 
corruption and national income levels.  I then analyzed GDPpc and EBQ1 (perception of 
corruption as a major national problem); the relationship between these variables is equally 
as strong.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 The CPI was first published in 1996, but did not include scores for all member states until 1998. 
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Table 5. Spearman’s Rho Correlation Coefficients EU-27  (1998-2010) 
Year GDP-CPI GDPpc-CPI 
1998 0.382 .829** 
1999 .496* .902** 
2000 .566** .906** 
2001 .524** .912** 
2002 .495** .895** 
2003 .487* .909** 
2004 .481* .897** 
2005 .481* .792** 
2006 .439* .884** 
2007 0.285 .898** 
2008 .392* .896** 
2009 0.209 .830** 
2010 0.349 .845** 
**P < .01; *P < .05 
 
The second model utilized correlation matrices to assess the effects of demographic 
and economic variables.  Statistically significant relationships between demographic 
variables and perceptions of corruption in political institutions are evident; however their 
strength is very weak.70  Demographic variables have the strongest effect on perception of 
corruption as a major national problem (0.101 in 2005) and in national institutions (0.086 in 
2007).71  The effect of education and gender on perception of corruption in law enforcement 
services is virtually nonexistent.  Age and occupation of the respondent, on the other hand, 
do result in significant correlations with law enforcement services in each survey year.   
Scholarly work has also produced inconsistent results regarding the relationship between 
various demographic factors and perceptions of corruption (Rose and Mishler 2010; 
Pázmándy 2011; Donchev and Ujhelyi 2008).   
Given the stark contrast in economic performance between the EU-15 and the new 
EU-12 member states, I chose to disaggregate the data into two datasets.  Three dependent 
                                                 
70 See Tables 10-15 in the Appendix. 
 
71 Tables 13-14 in the Appendix.  
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variables—EBQ1, national institutions, and national politicians—were re-tested to see if the 
effects of economic factors were maintained in the two regions.  Again, correlation matrices 
tested the relationship between economic factors and perceptions of corruption.  Results from 
both regions were fairly similar in 2005 and 2007; there were no statistically significant 
correlations between economic variables and any of the dependent corruption perception 
variables.   
In 2009, bivariate correlations between GDPpc and EBQ1 reveal strong, significant 
correlations (-0.590*, significant at the .05 level) for the EU-15.  In contrast, the Pearson’s R 
coefficient is -0.354 for the EU-12 (statistically insignificant).  Similar results are reported 
for national institutions (EU-15= 0.971**; EU-12= -0.270) and national politicians (EU-15= 
0.857**, EU-12= -0.149).72 
I continued the analysis of the 2009 data using OLS regression.  Among the EU-15 
member states, economic factors had significant influence on perceptions of corruption with 
approximately 80% of the variance explained for each variable.  1% or less of the variance is 
explained by the same economic indicators among member states in the EU-12.  Indicators of 
trust in national government and political parties, and anti-corruption variables, provide a 
better explanation for determinants of corruption perception in the newer member states.73  
This is likely due to the stringent measures newer member states of the EU-12 had to adopt 
prior to EU accession.  Furthermore, the EU has made it more of a priority to establish 
effective anti-corruption measures and reduce corruption in the EU-12 as opposed to 
                                                 
72 **= Significant at the .01 level. 
 
73 Limitations in statistical analysis only allowed me to test these subsets using the smaller, 27 case dataset, 
reducing the size of the sample even further.  This could have caused problems for the analysis of the data, 
skewing with the results.   
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members of the EU-15.74  Future research could include a more thorough analysis of regional 
differences in determinants of perceptions of corruption. 
The final test of H1 also entailed OLS regression, once again using data for the EU-
27.  All dependent variables were tested individually with the economic indicators for each                                                                                                                              
survey year.  The effect of GDPpc on EBQ1 is negative and significant for each year—lower 
per capita incomes are associated with higher perceptions of corruption as a major national 
problem.  GDPpc also has a statistically significant effect on politicians, but the strength of 
its effect is 0.00 in both 2007 and 2009.  Other economic factors, like the CCI and GDP 
growth, have stronger effects on perceptions of corruption. 
Table 6. OLS Regression Results EU-27 (2009) 
  EBQ1 Ntnl Inst Ntnl POL Police Judiciary Customs 
Adjusted R-
square 
0,656 0,903 0,599 0,401 0,52 0,376 
Constant 60,893 48,351 -25,7 58,536 54,864 38,393 
IV’s B Sig B  Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig 
GDPpc 0.000 0,178 0.000 0,284 0.00 0,106 -,001 0,635 -,001 ,035** 0,00 ,400 
Unemply 
Rate 
1,398 0,098 0,443 0,175 0,74 0,211 -,398 0,717 0,143 ,882 ,068 ,948 
GDP growth 2,148 ,012** 0,651 ,044** 0,53 0,351 ,548 0,57 ,903 ,291 ,617 ,502 
CCI -0,777 ,001*** -0,19 ,038** -0,35 0,036** -,513 0,100 -0,57 ,042** -0,75 ,016** 
Light 
Sentences 
0,696 0,221 0,564 ,011** 0,872 ,029** ,175 0,756 ,788 ,132 ,635 ,284 
Prosecutions 0,345 0,412 0,091 0,476 0,011 0,963 -0,42 0,322 -,088 ,816 -0,12 ,791 
Effective 
Govt 
-0,914 ,053* -0,60 ,002*** -0,15 0,636 -,709 0,128 -,614 ,146 -0,32 ,500 
*P <  0.10; **P <  0.05; ***; P < 0 .01 
 
The effect of economic factors on perceptions of corruption varies depending on the 
institution or government body in question.  In general, however, there are strong, significant 
effects that provide generous support for H1; poor economic performance results in negative 
perceptions of corruption.  
                                                 
74 http://ancorage-net.org/content/documents/dionisie-checchi-corruption_in_ee.pdf 
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

Prediction equations were created using Data-1 from 2007 to test H2 (see examples 
below).  Perceived levels of corruption were then calculated for the categories in which 
perceptions of corruption increased the most in each member state.  For the UK, Austria, 
Malta, Finland, and Spain, there are large differences between the actual scores and 
predication scores; economic factors do not provide complete explanations for the changes.  
Even greater differences are documented for institutions implicated in the corruption 
scandals.75 
Example Prediction Equations: 
NtnlPOL=29.548-.360CCI+.052RCI+0.00GDPpc+.000007475GDP+1.461grw+1.06unemploy 
Police=27.192-.647CCI+1.959grw+.542RCI 
The adjusted r-square for each category—using only economic indicators—is 
between 0.304 - 0.404 for politicians and institutions and 0.693-0.788 for law enforcement.  
The portion of the score explained by economic factors is obtained by multiplying the actual 
score by the r-square value.  Using the UK as an example: NtnlPOL—62 x 0.404 = 25.01; the 
predicted score is nearly twice this amount.  Economic variables leave a large percentage of 
the actual scored unexplained.  Demographic variables had either weak and statistically 
significant or minimal (and insignificant) effects on perceptions of corruption.  Therefore, the 
impact of corruption scandals on perceived corruption levels is supported.   
Prediction equations were also computed for a control case: Portugal.  Portugal did 
not experience any major corruption scandals prior to the 2009 EB survey.  It was also one of 
the member states hit hardest by the 2008 Great Recession.  One would expect economic 
factors to account for nearly all of the variance in the actual corruption perception scores.  
                                                 
75Details on the corruption scandals can be found in the 2009 EB report (pages 9-10, 25-26). 
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This expectation is maintained; the perception of corruption as a major national problem, in 
national institutions, and among politicians, the scores is almost entirely explained by the 
economic variables.  Results are displayed with the other five scandal states in Table 7 
below.   
Table 7. 2007 Prediction Equation Results (H2) 
  
  Spain UK Finland Malta Austria Portugal 
Category Prediction Actual Prediction Actual Prediction Actual Prediction Actual Prediction Actual Prediction Actual 
EBQ1         60 51     50 61 95  93  
NtnlINST         61 68 80 89     93 91 
RegINST             73 87         
LocINST                         
NtnlPOL     51 62 39 63 50 59 37 40  60 64  
RegPOL 49 66 37 51     43 44         
LocPOL                         
Police 28 46                     
Judiciary 16 47             10 25     
Customs 20 42                     
 
Although the prediction equations only provide an estimate of the total effect of 
economic variables, there is still considerable support for H2: major political corruption 
scandals augmented citizens´ perception of corruption in 2009.   

OLS regression was the primary statistical test used to determine the effects of anti-
corruption efforts on perceptions of corruption in law enforcement services.76  Several 
regression models were created for 2007, since the first major changes occurred in this 
survey year.  The first model included government institutions and politicians as independent 
                                                 
76 Table 19 in the Appendix presents the results from 2005.  Only national politicians and national institutions 
had statistically significant effects on the perceived corruption levels of law enforcement.  When all relevant 
independent variables are added to the model, the effect of politicians and institutions on law enforcement is 
maintained.  Statistically significant relationships are also observed between age and education and law 
enforcement.  The effect of ‘enough prosecutions’ proved to be very weak and statistically insignificant.   
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variables to gauge the effect of corruption scandals.  As the resulting adjusted r-square values 
were quite low, I included four demographic variables in the second regression model.   
Table 8. Spain 2007 Regression Results77 
  Police Judiciary Customs 
Adjusted R-square 0,082 0,112 0,090 
Constant 0,185 0,276 0,251 
Independent Variables B Sig B Sig B Sig 
National INST -0,051 .008*** -0,047 .012** -0,110 .000*** 
National POL 0,087 .011** 0,168 .000*** 0,040 0,257 
Regional POL 0,113 .003*** 0,122 .001*** 0,121 .002*** 
Local POL 0,068 .045** 0,010 0,769 0,025 0,486 
Prosecutions 0,008 0,574 0,003 0,810 0,009 0,564 
Education 0,000 0,807 0,000 0,884 0,001 0,269 
Gender 0,015 0,619 -0,030 0,293 0,042 0,179 
Age -0,015 0,398 -0,016 0,360 -0,010 0,596 
Occupation 0,000 0,872 -0,003 0,318 0,004 0,172 
*P <  0.10; **P <  0.05; ***; P < 0 .01 
  
National and regional politicians have positive, significant relationships with 
perceptions of corruption in law enforcement services.  The more citizens’ perceive 
politicians to be corrupt, the more likely they are to perceive law enforcement officials as 
corrupt (and vice versa).  Beta values for perceptions of corruption among regional 
politicians were the greatest (strongest effect) for all law enforcement sectors in 2007.  The 
Marbella scandal, which involved dozens of regional politicians, likely played a major role in 
the negative evaluations of all government institutions.  Interestingly, there is a negative, 
significant relationship between national institutions and law enforcement.  Perceptions of 
corruption in national institutions increased from 74-78% (2005-2007) and perceptions of 
corruption in law enforcement decreased.  In 2009 91% of respondents perceived national 
institutions as corrupt (+13%), so one would expect another sharp decline in perceptions of 
                                                 
77 When using the micro-level data from GESIS, responses are either 0 or 1 (not mentioned or mentioned; yes or 
no). Beta values can be interpreted as a respondent being more/less likely to perceive corruption in law 
enforcement services based upon their response for the independent variables.  
 
 37
corruption in law enforcement.  Instead, corruption perceptions increased nearly 30% for law 
enforcement services.  Although this relationship was one of the strongest, patterns in the 
data do not match accordingly, providing additional support for H3a.     
When perceptions of corruption in police and judicial services are tested solely with 
‘enough prosecutions’, there is a positive, significant relationship (0.086 and 0.082, 
respectively).  Bivariate correlations also indicate a weak, but significant, relationship 
between law enforcement and enough prosecutions.78  However, when additional variables 
are included, its effect is insignificant.  The results of the regression analysis provide some 
support for H3, but without ample empirical support, I cannot confidently accept H3.  
Additional anti-corruption survey questions would be beneficial for a more comprehensive 
analysis of this relationship but, unfortunately, the EB did not explore these areas in the 2007 
survey. 
In 2009, perceptions of corruption in national institutions and among politicians had 
significant relationships (p=0.000***) with police, judiciary, and customs (Table 9, p. 38).  
These results indicate an ‘echo chamber’ effect—an individual’s evaluation of corruption in 
one institution affects the respondent’s evaluations of other institutions.79  The ‘echo-
chamber’ effect proved to be a consistent pattern across surveys.  It can be expected that 
perceptions of corruption in national institutions will have some effect on other public 
institutions.  Law enforcement officials are an extension of the national government: they are 
“the state made of flesh.”80  However, perceptions of corruption in national institutions-
                                                 
78 Pearson’s R for Police= 0.109**, Judiciary= 0.122**, Customs= 0.080**. 
 
79 Rose and Mishler, 2008.  
 
80 Punch 2000: 322.  
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politicians increased across the EB surveys, and especially in 2007, when law enforcement 
recorded the most dramatic decreases.  The ‘echo-chamber’ effect and corruption scandals 
can only provide a partial explanation for the shifts reported for law enforcement.  
 By 2009, the Great Recession had already hit Spain.  The increasingly adverse 
economic conditions may have augmented citizens’ negative evaluations of law enforcement 
services.  I was unable to combine raw economic data with micro-level EB data in a single 
dataset.  Instead, four economic perception variables—obtained from a 2009 Standard EB 
survey—were included to test the effect of economic conditions on corruption perception.81  
Although the Great Recession contributed to particularly adverse economic conditions in 
Spain, the economic perception variables did not have statistically significant effects on 
corruption perception in any law enforcement category. 
Table 9. Spain Results 2009 
  Police Judiciary Customs 
Adjusted R-square 0,153 0,160 0,190 
Constant 0,326 0,323 0,294 
Independent Variables B Sig B Sig B Sig 
National INST -0,099 .000*** -0,109 .000*** -0,109 .000*** 
National POL 0,068 .089* 0,070 .083* 0,039 0,320 
Regional POL 0,089 .049** 0,140 .002*** 0,145 0.001*** 
Local POL 0,095 .017** 0,079 .046** 0,110 .004*** 
Law not applied 0,069 .046** 0,111 .001*** 0,029 0,388 
Prosecutions 0,011 0,477 0,009 0,529 0,026 .070* 
Effective Govt 0,056 .005*** 0,038 .052* 0,022 0,246 
Light Sentences -0,049 .002*** -0,041 .010** -0,057 .000*** 
No Real Punishment 0,053 .081* 0,040 0,182 0,015 0,614 
Education 0,004 .091* 0,002 0,391 0,005 .011** 
Gender -0,005 0,868 0,004 0,895 -0,002 0,952 
Age -0,036 .009*** -0,009 0,519 -0,022 0,101 
Occupation 0,012 0,177 0,009 0,297 0,009 0,315 
*P <  0.10; **P <  0.05; ***; P < 0 .01 
 
                                                 
81 See Description of Variables section in Appendix. 
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The introduction and effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts can aid in explaining this 
anomaly.  The inclusion of additional questions measuring public opinion on anti-corruption 
efforts allows for a more comprehensive analysis of their effect on perceptions of 
corruption.82  The five anti-corruption indicators were tested alone with each sector of law 
enforcement.  Roughly 8% of the variance is explained for each sector, half of the total 
variance that is explained using all of the independent variables.   
In accordance with H3a, all of the anti-corruption variables, with the exception of 
‘enough prosecutions’, resulted in statistically significant relationships with perceptions of 
corruption in law enforcement.  Government efforts (positive relationship) and light 
sentences (negative relationship) have the most significant effects on perceptions of 
corruption in law enforcement (see Table 9 above).  When additional demographic and 
institutional variables are added to the model, the statistical significance of anti-corruption 
variables is maintained.   
Sufficient empirical support is obtained in favor of H3a; the effectiveness of anti-
corruption efforts strongly influenced the perception of corruption in law enforcement in 
2009.  Police investigate corrupt activities and judges punish corrupt offenders.  With 
extensive media coverage, these law enforcement officials become associated with the 
success (or failure) of anti-corruption efforts.  
Despite rigorous statistical analysis, this study is not without its limitations.  Other 
factors not included in this study—such as quality of institutions or religious traditions—
                                                 
82 Micro-level data has not been made public yet on the GESIS website; therefore I was unable to evaluate 
changes in perceptions of corruption in Spain from 2009-2011.  A basic examination of the EB survey results 
shows citizens’ feel less confident about national anti-corruption efforts in 2011.  However, perceptions of 
corruption in law enforcement improved (approximately 10% for each branch).  Future research using micro-
level Spanish data is recommended to assess the relationship between these variables.  
 40
could potentially provide a better understanding of the determinants of corruption perception.  
Additionally, better indicators that truly capture anti-corruption awareness and perception of 
effectiveness should be included in future studies.  Finally, further testing using a dataset that 
is able to combine both raw economic data and corruption perception scores could help 
improve the reliability and validity of results.   
In the case study, additional testing could examine perceptions of corruption in 
countries that present a similar case—but lack intensive scandalization in the media—to 
determine if the effects of anti-corruption efforts on perceived corruption are upheld.  Also, 
the inclusion of other variables—for example, quality of institutions or religious traditions—
could potentially provide a more complete explanation for the determinants of perceptions of 
corruption.  Lastly, the inclusion of superior indicators for perceptions of anti-corruption 
efforts could improve the validity and reliability of these conclusions.  
 VII. Conclusion  
The EU recognizes that corruption remains a persistent problem within its member 
states, threatening economic recovery and political accountability in the short run and 
undermining trust in institutions in the long run.  Given this awareness, the EU included a 
new set of corrective actions in the 2011 Stockholm Programme.  The EU is now mandated 
to develop a coherent anti-corruption policy as well as monitor anti-corruption efforts in the 
member states.   
Furthermore, the EU is mandated to publish its first Anti-Corruption Report in 
2013—to be replicated on a biannual basis—that will include detailed assessments of each 
member state's anti-corruption efforts.83  This renewed commitment to the fight against 
corruption makes it even more important to fully understand the determinants of, and 
variance in, perceptions of corruption. 
This study has confirmed the profound political impact of economic factors on 
individuals' perceptions of corruption.  Political corruption scandals also generate 
considerable effects on individuals' evaluations of corruption in government.  Scandals are 
direct evidence of actual corrupt behavior, decreasing trust among political institutions and 
actors.  The combination of deteriorating economic conditions and highly-publicized 
scandals can cause perceptions of corruption to skyrocket, as evidenced by the experiences of 
the five "scandal" member states—Finland, Austria, the UK, Malta, and Spain. 
                                                 
83 EB 374 2011: 4. 
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The Spanish case study reveals that determinants of corruption perception can vary 
depending on the institution or politician.  The significant effect of anti-corruption measures 
on citizens' perceptions in law enforcement services is highlighted in the case study.  There is 
also strong support for the crucial role of the new media in shaping citizens' perceptions of 
corruption. 
Finally, the findings indicate effective enforcement and monitoring mechanisms 
should accompany anti-corruption measure to ensure public approval.  Drawing upon data 
from future EB surveys and Anti-Corruption Reports, EU policymakers will be able to 
construct the most comprehensive and effective anti-corruption programs possible.  These 
efforts should ultimately reduce the high levels of perceived corruption, thereby obtaining the 
desired result of increasing the legitimacy of law enforcement and government bodies.   
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Appendix 
Table 10. Correlation Matrix Economics-PoC EU-27 (2007) 
 Major 
PB 
REGinst NTNLinst POLICE JUDGE NtnlPol LocalPOL REGpol 
CCI Pearson 
Correlation 
-,766** -,752** -,694** -,507** -,481* -,407* -,593** -,618** 
GDP pc Pearson 
Correlation 
-,594** -,593** -,594** -,494** -,559** -,217 -,307 -,196 
GDP 
growth 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,165 ,183 ,282 ,482* ,510** ,068 ,010 -,071 
Unemploy 
rate 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,439* ,459* ,458* ,012 ,174 ,208 ,169 ,298 
*P <  0.05; **P <  0.01. N= 26,663  
Table 11. Correlation Matrix Economics-PoC EU-27 (2009) 
 
  Major 
Prob 
Local 
INST 
Reg 
INST 
Ntnl 
INST 
POLICE 
 
JUDGE NtnlPOL 
 
GDP pc Pearson 
Correlation 
-,630** -,682** -,682** -,721** -,516** -,593** -,453* 
GDP 
growth 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,027 -,072 -,072 -,134 -,137 -,074 -,112 
Unemploy 
rate 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,389* ,400* ,400* ,449* ,223 ,238 ,395* 
CCI Pearson 
Correlation 
,206 ,244 ,244 ,274 ,153 ,153 ,357 
*P <  0.05; **P <  0.01. N= 26,663  
Table 12. Correlation Matrix Economics-PoC EU-27 (2011) 
 Majo
r PB 
NtnlPol NtnlINS
T 
RegINST LocalIN
ST 
POLICE JUDGE 
GDP pc Pearson 
Correlation 
-,699** -,440* -,656** -,616** -,669** -,583** -,693** 
GDP change Pearson 
Correlation 
-,258 -,388* -,179 -,222 -,176 -,058 -,072 
Unemploy 
rate 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,458* ,514** ,496** ,530** ,517** ,300 ,380 
CCI Pearson 
Correlation 
-,711** -,502** -,597** -,590** -,622** -,559** -,596** 
*P <  0.05; **P <  0.01. N= 26,663  
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Table 13. Correlation Matrix Demographics-Perceptions of Corruption EU-27 (2005) 
    Gender Education Age Occupation 
Major Problem Pearson Correlation -,049** ,101** -,053** ,041** 
National INST Pearson Correlation -,040** ,083** -,023** ,026** 
Police 
 
 
 
Pearson Correlation ,016* -,001 -,074** ,016* 
Customs 
 
Pearson Correlation ,009 -,007 -,052** ,012 
Judicial Pearson Correlation ,031** -,018** -,035** ,005 
National POL Pearson Correlation ,004 -,035** -,021** ,021** 
Regional POL Pearson Correlation -,020** -,043** -,007 ,027** 
Local POL Pearson Correlation -,026** -,038** -,005 ,025** 
*P <  0.05; **P <  0.01. N= 26,663  
Table 14. Correlation Matrix Demographics-Perceptions of Corruption EU-27 (2007) 
   Education Gender Age Occupation 
Major Problem Pearson Correlation ,100** -,050** -,049** ,044** 
National 
Institutions 
Pearson Correlation ,086** -,049** -,008 ,027** 
National 
Politicians 
Pearson Correlation -,030** ,008 -,039** ,035** 
Police Pearson Correlation ,010 ,011 -,087** ,021** 
Customs Pearson Correlation -,012 ,009 -,055** ,031** 
Judiciary Pearson Correlation -,021** ,014* -,036** ,011 
*P <  0.05; **P <  0.01. N= 26,663  
Table 15. Correlation Matrix Demographic Data and Perceptions of corruption (EU-27 2009) 
    Education Gender Age Occupation 
Major Problem Pearson Correlation ,051** -,024** -,048** -,010 
Local INST Pearson Correlation ,026** ,013* -,012* ,035** 
Regional INST Pearson Correlation ,026** ,008 -,020** ,033** 
National INST Pearson Correlation ,041** ,005 -,020** ,022** 
Police Pearson Correlation -,049** ,008 -,068** -,007 
Customs Pearson Correlation -,045** ,003 -,045** -,029** 
Judiciary Pearson Correlation -,045** ,020** -,027** -,002 
National POL Pearson Correlation -,042** ,005 -,009 -,017** 
Regional POL Pearson Correlation -,021** -,006 ,004 -,038** 
Local POL Pearson Correlation -,019** -,013* -,002 -,040** 
*P <  0.05; **P <  0.01. N= 26,663  
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Table 16. EU-27 Regression Results (2005) 
  EBQ1 Ntnl Inst Ntnl POL Police Judiciary Customs 
Adjusted 
R-square 
0,803 0,803 0,458 0,701 0,701 0,485 
Constant 103,56 87,26 34,56 64,591 47,91 58,02 
IV's B Sig B  Sig B Sig B Sig B  Sig B  Sig 
GDPpc -0,002 ,019*
* 
-0,001 ,051* 0,000 0,626 -0,001 ,095* -,001 0,149 -
,001 
0,22 
Unemploy -0,622 0,447 0,095 0,891 1,308 0,188 -0,114 0,907 ,979 0,337 ,049 0,96 
GDP 
growth 
-1,27 0,515 -0,228 0,891 0,977 0,672 0,55 0,815 -0,18 0,940 ,052 0,98
5 
CCI -0,582 ,041*
* 
-0,539 ,029** -0,277 0,38 -0,077 0,807 -,166 0,611 ,058 0,87 
RCI 0,256 0,241 0,419 ,035** 0,538 ,049** 0,573 ,041** ,679 ,021** ,453 0,14 
*P <  0.10; **P <  0.05; ***; P < 0 .01. N= 27 
 
Table 17. EU-27 Regression Results (2007) 
OLS Regression Results 
DV and 
adjusted R-
squared 
EBQ1:  
.706 
Ntnl  
Inst: .700 
Ntnl POL:  
.404 
Reg  
INST: .645 
Reg POL:  
.304 
Constant 30,076 34,613 29.548 57,531 28.028 
IV´s B Sig B  Sig B Sig B Sig B  Sig 
GDP     7.47E-6 .051**     
GDPpc     .000 .541 0,000 0,079* 0,000 0,005*** 
Unemploy 2,905 0.032** 2,851 .012** 1.060 .382 2,057 0,114 1.074 .246 
GDP growth 2,708 0.006*** 2,969 .001*** 1.461 .327   -2.05E-5 .947 
CCI -1,060 0.000*** -0,79 .000*** -.360 .172 -0,700 .00*** -.275 .137 
RCI     .052 .734   .184 .128 
Trust Govt.     -0,151 0,462     
Ntnl POL         0,134 0,129 
Ntnl INST         -0,26 0,326 
Reg INST         1,112 0.002*** 
Local INST         -0,45 0,060 
*P <  0.10; **P <  0.05; ***; P < 0 .01. N= 27 
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Table 17a. 2007 Regression Results (continued) 
  OLS Regression Results 
DV and 
adjusted R-
squared 
Local INST:  
.654 
Local POL:  
.339 
Police:  
.727 
Judiciary 
.788 
Customs: 
 .693 
Constant 58,890 34.881 27.192 14.456 23.540 
IV´s B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig 
GDP 0,000 0,072* .000 .543 .000 .457 .000 .609 0.000 .658 
GDPpc 2,281 0,072* -0,954 0,099*       
Unemploy -0,687 .000*** -.244 .148 -.647 .020** -.700 .005** -.580 .018** 
GDP growth   .143 .159 .542 .003*** .539 .001*** .489 .002*** 
CCI     1.959 .222 0,658 0.032** 1.496 .288 
RCI     0,578 0,096 0,658 0.032**   
Trust Govt.       -0,856 0.002***   
Trust Justice     -0,670 0.029**     
Ntnl POL   0,065 0,734     0.036 0.760 
Ntnl INST           
Reg INST   0,343 0,075*       
 
Table 18. EU-27 Regression Results (2011) 
   
  EBQ1 Ntnl Inst Ntnl POL Police Judiciary Customs 
Adjusted R-
square 
0,571 0,461 0,279 0,434 0,558 0,476 
Constant 114,126 81,8 47,981 30,272 -2,515 72.399 
IV´s B Sig B  Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig 
GDP 5,6E-7 0,907                     
GDPpc -0,002 0.012** -,001 .002** 0,000 0,125             
Unemploy -0,157 0,859 1,227 .075* 1,437 0,034**             
GDP  
growth 
-2,937 0,21                     
CCI 0,042 0,915                     
RCI -0,429 0,243                     
Light              0,416 0,131 0,793 .005** ,207 0,71 
Prosecutions             -0,96 .006*** -0,86 .010* -,22 ,674 
Party                      -1,5 .004** 
Effective                      -,07 ,859 
*P <  0.10; **P <  0.05; ***; P < 0 .01. N=1,004 
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Table 19. Regression Results-Spain (2005) 
  Police Judiciary Customs 
Adjusted R-square 0,313 0,350 0,284 
Constant 0,396 0,325 0,621 
Independent Variables B Sig B Sig B Sig 
National INST -0,112 .000*** -0,108 .000*** -0,060 .013** 
National POL 0,233 .000*** 0,278 .000*** 0,156 .004*** 
Regional POL 0,110 .082* 0,123 .047** 0,162 .013** 
Local POL 0,154 .005*** 0,140 .009*** 0,194 .001*** 
Prosecutions 0,018 0,231 0,037 .011** 0,010 0,487 
Education -0,010 .053* -0,004 0,427 -0,016 .002*** 
Gender 0,023 0,466 0,021 0,493 -0,028 0,387 
Age -0,034 .038** -0,034 .035** -0,083 .000*** 
Occupation 0,003 0,228 0,002 0,529 -0,002 0,505 
*P <  0.10; **P <  0.05; ***; P < 0 .01. N=1,004 

Table 20. Regression Results-Spain: Perception of Economic Situation (2009) 
  Police Judiciary Customs 
Adjusted R-square 0.047 0.094 0.096 
Constant 0.349 0.568 0.465 
Independent Variables B Sig B Sig B Sig 
NtnlECON 0.039 0.401 -0.027 0.548 -0.005 0.907 
FinanHOUSE 0.001 0.977 -0.074 .081* 0.035 0.403 
EconEXPECT 0.009 0.767 0.008 0.794 0.030 0.322 
FinanEXPECT -0.022 0.499 -0.023 0.454 -0.060 0.051* 
Prosecute 0.04 0.098* 0.009 0.687 0.047 0.040** 
LawnotApplied 0.049 0.362 0.139 .009*** -0.012 0.822 
No Punishment 0.092 0.064* 0.129 .008*** 0.079 0.101 
EffectiveGovt 0.056 0.079* 0.068 .030** 0.025 0.415 
LightSentences -0.075 0.004*** -0.095 .000*** -0.115 .000*** 
Educ -0.009 0.283 -0.005 0.563 -0.017 .034** 
Gender -0.045 0.35 -0.021 0.652 -0.039 0.409 
Age 0.014 0.588 0.001 0.969 0.014 0.586 
Occupation 0.003 0.535 0.01 .011** 0.012 .004*** 
*P <  0.10; **P <  0.05; ***; P < 0 .01. N=1,004 
 

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Dependent Variables:  
Perceptions of Corruption in institutions, public services, and among politicians: 
 
QB1: for each of the following statements, could you please tell me whether you 
agree or disagree with it. 
 1) Corruption as a Major Problem 
 2-4) Corruption in National, Regional, and Local Institutions 
1=totally agree, 2=tend to agree, 3=tend to disagree, 4=totally disagree 
QB2: In (OUR COUNTRY), do you think that the giving and taking of bribes, and 
the abuse of positions of power for personal gain, are widespread among any of the 
following? 
 5-7) Politicians at National, Regional, and Local Levels 
 8-10) Officials in Police, Judicial, and Customs Services 
0=not mentioned, 1=mentioned 

Independent Variables:  
Economic Indicators84: 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures the total final market value of all 
goods and services produced within a country during a given period. It is reported in 
millions of euro. 
 
GDP growth: “For measuring the growth rate of GDP in terms of volumes, the GDP 
at current prices are valued in the prices of the previous year and the thus computed 
volume changes are imposed on the level of a reference year.” 
 
GDP per capita: Nominal Gross Domestic Product per capita. 
 
Unemployment rate: “The unemployment rate represents unemployed persons as a 
percentage of the labour force based on International Labour Office (ILO) definition. 
The labour force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. Data are 
presented in seasonally adjusted form.” 
 
Consumer and Retail Trade Sentiment Indicators: “The Economic Sentiment 
Indicator (ESI) is a composite indicator made up of five sectoral confidence 
indicators with different weights: Industrial confidence indicator, Services confidence 
indicator, Consumer confidence indicator, Construction confidence indicator Retail 
trade confidence indicator. Confidence indicators are arithmetic means of seasonally 
adjusted balances of answers to a selection of questions closely related to the 
                                                 
84 All economic variable description were obtained from the Eurostat database; available from: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=teibs010 
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reference variable they are supposed to track (e.g. industrial production for the 
industrial confidence indicator). The economic sentiment indicator (ESI) is calculated 
as an index with mean value of 100 and standard deviation of 10 over a fixed 
standardised sample period.” 
 
Trust:   
QA9: I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain 
institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it 
or tend not to trust it. 
 1) Government 
 2) Political parties 
3) Police 
4) Justice/ (NATIONALITY) legal system  
 5) (NATIONALITY) Parliament 
1= tend to trust, 2=tend not to trust 
 
Perception of Economic Factors 
QA4: How would you judge the current situation in each of the following? 
The situation of the national economy 
The financial situation of your household 
1=better, 2=worse, 3=same 
 
QA5: What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve 
months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to...? 
The economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY) 
The financial situation of your household 
1=better, 2=worse, 3=same 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts:  
QB1:for each of the following statements, could you please tell me whether you agree 
or disagree with it. 
1) There are enough successful prosecutions in (OUR COUNTRY) to deter people 
from giving or receiving bribes 
1=totally agree, 2=tend to agree, 3=tend to disagree, 4=totally disagree 
(Additional questions from the 2009 survey) 
QB4 In your opinion, what are the reasons why there is corruption in (OUR 
COUNTRY)’s society? 
 2) The law is often not applied by the authorities in charge 
3) There is no real punishment for corruption (light sentences in the courts or no 
prosecution) 
0=Not mentioned, 1=Mentioned  
4) Government efforts to combat corruption are effective 
 5) Court sentences in corruption cases are too light in (OUR COUNTRY)  
1=totally agree, 2=tend to agree, 3=tend to disagree, 4=totally disagree 

Control Variables: 
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Gender: 1= female, 2= male 
Education: How old were you when you stopped full-time education? 
1 Up to 14 years 
2 15 years 
3 16 years 
4 17 years 
5 18 years 
6 19 years 
7 20 years 
8 21 years 
9 22 years and older 
10 Still studying 
11 No full-time education 
97 Refusal 
98 DK 
Occupation: What is your current occupation? 
NON-ACTIVE 
1 Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or without any 
current occupation, not working 
2 Student 
3 Unemployed or temporarily not working 
4 Retired or unable to work through illness 
SELF EMPLOYED 
5 Farmer 
6 Fisherman 
7 Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.) 
8 Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self-employed person 
9 Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company 
EMPLOYED 
10 Employed professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect) 
11 General management, director or top management (managing directors, director 
general, other director) 
12 Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, 
teacher, technician) 
13 Employed position, working mainly at a desk 
14 Employed position, not at a desk but traveling (salesmen, driver, etc.) 
15 Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, 
fireman, etc.) 
16 Supervisor 
17 Skilled manual worker 
18 Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant 
 
Age: How old are you? 
1 15 - 24 years 
2 25 - 39 years 
 51
3 40 - 54 years 
4 55 years and older 
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